Ready… or Not? Our Views on Seven Companies with New CEOs
One of our favorite turnaround catalysts is a change in a company’s leadership. Struggling companies usually require major and deep changes, and the most effective and often the only way to turn things around is to bring in a fresh perspective. CEOs have immense power to effect change – they determine a company’s strategic direction, choose its capital allocation and operating priorities and select other senior leaders to help execute the plan. Critically, the CEO drives the company’s culture, as “the tone is set at the top.” This tone cascades down through the entire organization and can make or break a turnaround.
Each CEO brings a somewhat unique combination of mindset, experiences and technical background. Some are top-down strategists – their focus on the big-picture direction and how various segments fit together usually brings divestitures of some operations and acquisitions of others. Other CEOs are bottom-up fix-it types that emphasize deep-in-the-weeds improvements in efficiency, costs and product rosters. Neither is inherently better than the other, with most turnarounds requiring a bit of both perspectives. A prime example of the power of a combined skillset approach, along with setting the right tone, can be found in General Electric (GE). Two decades of mismanagement, along with the global financial crisis, nearly destroyed the company. Outsider CEO Larry Culp executed an aggressive top-down and bottom-up turnaround that has restored prosperity to General Electric, culminating in the three-way split-up now underway.
To be successful, the new leader’s skill set should match the company’s needs. An excellent example is the turnaround that started just over a decade ago at Applied Materials (AMAT). The company was struggling in the early 2000s, and its then-new CEO’s prior experience emphasized marketing. Semiconductor production equipment is among the most technically advanced gear in the world, so customers make purchases based on technical specifications and discussions among engineers, not on marketing spiff. And, those engineers need to be supported by intense and focused research and development to maintain the products’ leading-edge capabilities, something that marketing executives aren’t usually equipped to properly foster. It took Gary Dickerson, who had deep operations and production development experience along with an engineering-first mindset, to revitalize the company when he joined as CEO in 2011. Today, Applied Materials is the undisputed industry leader and Dickerson is among the most respected and top-performing leaders in business.
Successful turnaround investing often requires a two-step process. The first step involves identifying promising turnarounds, followed by a small initial investment. Most turnarounds take several quarters – or years – to start showing meaningful fundamental progress. During this phase, when the underlying progress can be subtle and masked by disappointing headline numbers, the shares can tumble further as investors abandon the name. The savvy turnaround investor will use this time to gain a deeper understanding of the situation, which can only come from owning some shares. The second step involves taking a much larger share position at the lower prices if the core turnaround story remains intact. If the turnaround is ultimately successful, most of the sizeable investment profits are produced by these second-round share purchases.
Ready… or Not? Companies with New CEOs | ||||||
Company | Symbol | Recent Price | % Chg vs 52 Week High | Market Cap $Bil. | EV/EBITDA* | Dividend Yield (%) |
Attractive Now | ||||||
Alight, Inc. | ALIT | 9.93 | -4 | 5.6 | 10.9 | - |
JetBlue Airways | JBLU | 7.08 | -25 | 2.4 | 5.8 | - |
Koninklijke Philips NV | PHG | 20 | -18 | 18.3 | 6.9 | - |
Reckitt-Benckiser Group | RBGLY | 11.06 | -33 | 39.5 | 9.9 | 4.5 |
Not Quite Ready Yet | ||||||
El Pollo Loco | LOCO | 8.82 | -19 | 0.3 | 6.7 | - |
Boston Beer Company | SAM | 307.12 | -22 | 3.7 | 13.7 | - |
Under Armour | UAA | 7.15 | -25 | 3.1 | 5.5 | - |
Closing prices on March 22, 2024.
* Enterprise value/earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Based on consensus estimates for calendar years ending in 2024.
Sources: Company releases, Sentieo, S&P Capital IQ and Cabot Turnaround Letter analysis.
Discussed below are four new-CEO turnaround situations now underway that look attractive enough for an initial investment. We also include three others that, for one reason or another, are not quite ready yet.
These turnaround stocks currently look attractive:
Alight, Inc (ALIT) – While this company’s CEO is relatively new (since mid-2020), he might soon be replaced, as activist investor Starboard Value (7.8% stake) has nominated four candidates for board seats and is seeking major changes to Alight’s operations. Despite its meaningless corporate name, Alight is an old-line company. The firm was founded in 1940 as Hewitt Associates and grew to become a major human resources and benefits consulting firm. It was acquired by Aon Corp in 2010, then was carved out and sold to private equity firm Blackstone in 2017. Alight returned to public ownership through a SPAC deal in 2021.
Alight’s expenses have ballooned from efforts to accelerate its software offerings. This new focus, no doubt supported by the board, is driven by the CEO’s strong background in software companies like Lawson Software, Oracle, Peoplesoft and 1010 Data. But his lack of experience in Alight’s industry is a major concern as the attempted transition toward software hasn’t gone well. The pace and scale of the cost increases look undisciplined, and investors have been unimpressed with the results. Perhaps worse, despite the weak performance, the CEO has received compensation of over $82 million in the past three years. Similarly, the CFO has received $26 million. These rewards look excessive, particularly given the shares’ weak performance in a strong stock market.
Alight’s business is attractive and will be improved after it completes the recently announced deal to sell its Payroll & Professional Services business to HIG Capital for $1.2 billion. Post-deal Alight will have a blue-chip client roster with a 93% renewal rate, healthy revenue growth, 25% EBITDA margins and a sub-3x EBITDA net debt ratio. Cash flow will remain reasonably strong but subpar nevertheless. The shares trade at a 10.9x EBITDA multiple, well below what probably should be a 15x valuation. Improvements to the company’s board membership and leadership might go a long way toward healing what ails Alight.
JetBlue Airways (JBLU) – Airline stocks have fallen on tough times, and JetBlue’s shares are no exception. The stock has tumbled 66% from its pandemic peak and now trades near its long-time lows. While industry conditions have been difficult, many of JetBlue’s problems are self-inflicted. A major factor has been its long-delayed and now terminated deal to acquire Spirit Airlines (SAVE). No doubt considerable attention and effort were diverted in anticipation of the deal, but now JetBlue can focus exclusively on getting its own house in order. Activist investor Carl Icahn’s recent appearance as a 10% shareholder is likely spurring an accelerated pace given several leadership changes: a new CEO, two new Icahn-selected board members, a new chief operating officer and a new president. Operating changes are underway as well, with reductions of unprofitable routes, additions of attractive new routes, a cost-cutting initiative and the deferral of nearly $2.5 billion in capital spending. Given Boeing’s chronic quality problems and delays in new jet deliveries, JetBlue’s Boeing-free fleet may garner extra traffic and pricing power. JetBlue’s balance sheet carries $1.7 billion in unrestricted cash, helping relieve pressure from its $4.7 billion in debt and sizeable operating losses. The shares discount only modest earnings improvements – it wouldn’t take much of a tailwind to put some lift under this company’s share price.
Koninklijke Philips NV (PHG) – Philips is a European conglomerate with three segments: Diagnostics and Treatment (50% of sales), Connected Care (30%) and Personal Health (20%). Most of its equipment is sold to hospitals, has top market share positions and produces a reasonably high mix (40%) of revenues from recurring sales. Its electric toothbrush business offers healthy secular growth potential. Partly offsetting these positives is that the 10.6% operating margin (measured by EBIT) seems low to us, likely reflecting weak pricing and elevated expenses typical of a European conglomerate. Also, Philips is under pressure from an onerous consent decree, lingering potential for fines and liabilities, and likely permanent franchise erosion from its ventilator and sleep device debacle. The recent settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding a bribery scandal in China adds another overhang.
What do we like about this stock? First, the valuation is low, at 6.9x EBITDA, which provides some downside protection yet also meaningful upside if the company’s issues are resolved. Second, we like the change in CEO: Roy Jakobs took the helm in 2022 and is implementing a sensible turnaround focused on fundamentals. Third, the balance sheet and cash flow look sturdy enough to support the company even if the ventilator/sleep device payouts are high. And fourth, Exor NV, the highly regarded Italian company sometimes called the “European Berkshire Hathaway,” has recently taken a 15% stake in Philips to support the turnaround.
Reckitt-Benckiser Group plc (RBGLY) – This longstanding British company (founded in 1840) is an “island of misfit toys” given its portfolio of over twenty past-their-prime but durable consumer brands like Lysol, Airwick, Woolite, Clearasil and Enfamil. However, these brands face steady competition and margin pressure, which has weighed on Reckitt’s volumes and profits. Weak fourth-quarter results led to a crisp 25% share price drop, putting the shares at 10-year lows. Two other issues loom over the company: the potential liability from claims relating to Reckitt’s Mead Johnson products, and a possible accounting issue, although that appears to be isolated in Reckitt’s Middle East operations.
What makes this company interesting is its complete leadership overhaul: new board chair, new CEO and new CFO. This team looks highly qualified to execute its sensible turnaround plan, backed by Reckitt’s healthy 60% gross margin, low debt burden and reasonable free cash flow. This plan appears to be in the ugly/early stage in which the headline numbers are going in the wrong direction. Reckitt’s grim newsflow scares away most investors, but the underlying fundamentals are starting to improve. And, the valuation at 9.9x EBITDA is unchallenging compared to its peers, providing some margin for safety yet also offering decent upside potential if the turnaround is successful.
These turnaround stocks are not quite ready yet:
Boston Beer Company (SAM) – Founded in 1984, this company defines craft brewing success, as it now generates over $2 billion in revenues. With its introduction of new brands, particularly alternatives like Twisted Tea, Boston Beer’s profits surged, as did its shares, which rose 10-fold after mid-2017. However, with the end of the pandemic and the fading of the alternatives fad, the company’s shares turned sour, down 78% from the top and now sitting at their 2015 price. The former CEO, who led much of the company’s growth, just retired and is being replaced by a highly capable new leader. Boston Beer carries no debt, has healthy free cash flow and is generally financially healthy. While volume growth continues to be negative, we are reasonably confident this will eventually stabilize. Two issues keep us on the sidelines. First, what previously propelled the shares to great heights was the company’s exceptional positioning for the powerful alternative beverages trend, but its ability to (almost literally) catch lightning in a bottle once again is a complete unknown. And, trading at 13.7x EBITDA and at a 4% free cash flow yield, the shares are no bargain. Perhaps if the stock ever dipped to the $150 range, for example, we would be aggressive buyers as that low price would likely factor in humbled expectations about Boston Beer’s future.
El Pollo Loco (LOCO) – Shares of this small-cap restaurant company, which focuses on quick-serve Mexican food at its 490 locations primarily in the western United States, have slid 55% since early 2021 and remain below their $15 IPO price (in July 2014). The company has long struggled with revenue and profit growth. Earlier this year, El Pollo Loco replaced its CEO with Liz Williams, who is highly regarded for her successes from 2010 to 2020 when she was CFO and then president of Taco Bell International.
Restaurant turnarounds can be difficult – consumer tastes can change quickly and competition for their attention is fierce, which are unrelenting threats to revenues. So, a critical ingredient is revenue stability, driven by customer loyalty and the degree to which the restaurant is part of customers’ regular eating routines. Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) is a legendary example: despite the risk of incurring food poisoning, its customers were fiercely loyal and kept coming back because Chipotle was a favorite lunchtime habit. For El Pollo Loco, we have little to no insight into its customers’ loyalty or their dining habits, so revenue stability is the biggest hurdle to our gaining enough comfort with the turnaround. The other hurdle is uncertainty around El Pollo Loco’s restaurant-level costs, notable wages, ingredients and electricity. The company’s balance sheet carries reasonable debt while free cash flow is modest but positive. We have a mixed view of the ownership base – Biglari Holdings, a controversial Berkshire Hathaway “wannabe,” has a 13% stake, while the highly credible private equity firm Capital Spring holds a 5% stake. The share valuation (at 6.7x EBITDA) is not yet attractive enough. If the shares dip while the underlying turnaround makes progress, we would be much more interested in taking a position in El Pollo Loco shares.
Under Armour (UAA) – An all-American success story, Under Armour was founded in 1996 by Kevin Plank, a former football player for the University of Maryland. Rapidly growing profits pushed the shares upward from the split-adjusted IPO price of $3.25/share to over $53 by 2015. However, a major accounting irregularity along with faded growth and profit prospects have unraveled the price spike, leaving the shares down 85% from the peak and stuck at their 2007 level. Leadership turnover is a lingering problem, as Under Armour has changed CEOs three times in the past five years. Most recently, founder and controlling shareholder Plank returned to the helm after ousting Stephanie Linnartz, who completed only one year as CEO. Given the leadership churn, the company has almost no chance of executing a successful turnaround. And, Plank’s return violates the maxim that “the leader who got the company into trouble is unlikely to be the one to lead it out of trouble.”
Under Armour has a highly recognizable brand, more cash than debt, generates healthy free cash flow and its shares trade at an unchallenging 5.5x EBITDA. But we remain on the sidelines due to the dysfunctional leadership. A turnaround at Under Armour is no lay-up and is highly vulnerable to unforced errors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Purchase Recommendation: Barnes Group (B)
Barnes Group (B) 123 Main Street Bristol, Connecticut 06010 |
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Background:
Barnes Group is an industrial company that operates in two segments. The Aerospace segment (about 57% of estimated 2024 revenues) produces original equipment and aftermarket parts and provides maintenance, repair and overhaul services for commercial and defense jet engines, nacelles and structures. The Industrial segment (43%) produces precision plastic injection molding gear, a variety of automation components, and high-performance vehicle suspension systems. About 50% of sales are generated outside of the Americas.
Until 1991, when Wallace Barnes retired at age 65, the company had been led by a Barnes family member since its founding in 1857. Wallace Barnes led an effort to diversify the company away from its Associated Spring automotive and industrial springs business by acquiring Bowman Distribution Group in 1964 and entering the aerospace business in the early 1980s. Barnes Group has remained a publicly traded company since its initial public offering in 1946.
Even after the recent sharp bounce, Barnes’ shares trade about 50% below their late 2017 peak and are unchanged from the top of a spike in 2007. Investors worry about the company’s strategic direction, lack of revenue growth and margin improvement despite its many acquisitions and portfolio re-shufflings, and its exposure to automotive customers and General Electric. With many other industrial companies to choose from, investors have had little reason to select the shares of an uninspiring company like Barnes.
Analysis:
Significant positive changes are coming to Barnes Group. These changes started in mid-2022 with the arrival of Thomas Hook, who was at the time a Barnes board member and CEO of another company. Hook brought valuable leadership and industrial experience along with public company CEO experience. Since Hook’s arrival, Barnes has begun to improve its strategic direction and capital allocation priorities.
Barnes’ strategic direction previously emphasized the cyclical and low-margin Industrial segment. The segment’s failed acquisition-driven orientation is now being reversed – replaced by an emphasis on integrating, consolidating and rationalizing its product roster, production footprint and cost structure. The recently announced deal to sell its Associated Spring/Hänggi businesses, which generate nearly 25% of Industrial segment revenues, to a private equity firm for $175 million is a meaningful step in this direction. Importantly, Barnes has completely exited the low-margin automotive components industry. For 2024, Industrial revenues are guided toward a 1-2% organic growth rate, with an adjusted EBITDA margin of about 15.5%.
Barnes’ new strategy emphasizes its higher-margin and faster-growth Aerospace segment. The company notably demonstrated this shift with last year’s acquisition of MB Aerospace for $728 million, which will add about $330 million in high-margin revenues. The addition should strengthen and deepen Barnes’ capabilities and lead to better growth and margins. For 2024, management guided for Aerospace revenues to increase by about 11% on an organic basis and for the EBITDA margin to expand to between 23.5% and 25.0% – encouraging indicators that this segment has healthy underlying fundamentals. More strategic changes are likely ahead, as management is aiming for the Aerospace segment to eventually produce about 70% of total revenues.
As it moves toward better businesses and tighter execution, Barnes is targeting $42 million (about 3.8% of revenues) in total company run-rate cost savings by 2025.
Barnes’ new and more sensible capital allocation should also help restore investor faith. The top capital priority is now debt reduction, given Barnes’ elevated debt at 3.6x EBITDA. The $150 million in net proceeds from its recent divestiture will help management reach its goal of 2.5x leverage by 2025. Favorably, the nearest debt maturity is four years away, in 2028. The second priority is to re-invest in its existing businesses. This type of spending typically generates high returns by improving organic growth prospects, upgrading operational capabilities and reducing costs, yet comes with lower risks because the company is deeply familiar with its own business (particularly compared to all of the unknowns that come with acquisitions). Capital outlays this year will increase to about $65 million, almost double the level two years ago.
Acquisitions, which previously consumed as much as half of Barnes’ free cash flow yet produced essentially zero revenue growth or margin improvement, have been demoted to a low priority. The company remains committed to continuing its 90-year record for consecutive dividend payments. Related to better capital allocation, Barnes is focused on releasing cash tied up in excess working capital.
A major positive for Barnes’ shares is that the turnaround is being accelerated by pressure from activist investor Irenic Capital, which holds a 5% stake. Led by Adam Katz, a veteran of highly regarded activist Elliott Management, Irenic has reached an agreement with Barnes to replace two long-standing board members (including a Barnes family member). Also, Barnes agreed to add Larry Lawson as a special advisor to the board and senior management. Lawson is the former CEO of Spirit AeroSystems – a major Boeing supplier – who brings valuable leadership, industry and private equity experience. We would not be surprised if Lawson is eventually moved into the Barnes CEO role.
This turnaround holds considerable promise. With the shares trading at a discounted 8.9x EBITDA, we see sizeable upside potential. Like all turnarounds, this one has risks, including those from external challenges from competitive and industry conditions, as well as from potential internal execution and other possible difficulties. And, like all turnarounds, this one will likely move forward in fits and starts. All-in, Barnes’ shares look like an attractive turnaround investment.
We recommend the purchase of Barnes Group (B) shares with a $55 price target.
Ratings Changes
On Friday, March 8, we moved shares of LB Foster (FSTR) from BUY to SELL. The turnaround continues to grind forward, but the stock moved above our $23 price target and we saw little reason to increase it. The likelihood of the company reaching its 2025 guidance is fairly high, so the only upside would be from earning a higher valuation multiple. We’ll take our certain profits today instead of letting them ride on the possibility of more profits in the future, balanced by the possibility of a backward slide. The shares generated a 71% total return since our July 2023 recommendation compared to a 21.0% total return for the S&P 500 over the same period.
You can find more details by visiting our website at cabotwealth.com.
The chief analyst of the Cabot Turnaround Letter personally holds shares of every company on the Current Recommendations List. The chief analyst may purchase securities discussed in the “Purchase Recommendation” section or sell securities discussed in the “Sell Recommendation” section but not before the fourth day after the recommendation has been emailed to subscribers. However, the chief analyst may currently hold and may purchase or sell securities mentioned in other parts of the Cabot Turnaround Letter at any time.
Performance
The following tables show the performance of all our currently active recommendations, plus recently closed out recommendations.
Large Cap1 (over $10 billion) Current Recommendations
Recommendation | Symbol | Rec. Issue | Price at Rec. | 3/22/24 | Total Return (3) | Current Yield | Rating and Price Target |
General Electric | GE | Jul 2007 | 304.96 | 175.15 | -12*** | 0.2% | Buy (160) |
Nokia Corporation | NOK | Mar 2015 | 8.02 | 3.58 | -41 | 3.7% | Buy (12) |
Macy’s | M | Jul 2016 | 33.61 | 20.25 | -18 | 3.3% | Buy (25) |
Newell Brands | NWL | Jun 2018 | 24.78 | 7.66 | -50 | 3.7% | Buy (39) |
Vodafone Group plc | VOD | Dec 2018 | 21.24 | 8.60 | -36 | 11.4% | Buy (32) |
Berkshire Hathaway | BRK/B | Apr 2020 | 183.18 | 411.60 | +125 | 0.0% | HOLD |
Wells Fargo & Company | WFC | Jun 2020 | 27.22 | 57.13 | +123 | 2.5% | Buy (64) |
Western Digital Corporation | WDC | Oct 2020 | 38.47 | 63.94 | +66 | 0.0% | Buy (78) |
Elanco Animal Health | ELAN | Apr 2021 | 27.85 | 15.82 | -43 | 0.0% | Buy (44) |
Walgreens Boots Alliance | WBA | Aug 2021 | 46.53 | 20.58 | -45 | 4.9% | Buy (70) |
Volkswagen AG | VWAGY | Aug 2022 | 19.76 | 14.83 | -12 | 7.7% | Buy (29) |
Warner Brothers Discovery | WBD | Sep 2022 | 13.16 | 8.44 | -36 | 0% | Buy (20) |
Capital One Financial | COF | Nov 2022 | 96.25 | 141.16 | +50 | 1.7% | Buy (150) |
Bayer AG | BAYRY | Feb 2023 | 15.41 | 7.20 | -50 | 0.4% | Buy (25) |
Tyson Foods | TSN | Jun 2023 | 52.01 | 58.05 | +15 | 3.4% | Buy (78) |
Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd | AEM | Nov 2023 | 49.80 | 55.64 | +13 | 2.9% | Buy (75) |
Fidelity National Info Svces | FIS | Dec 2023 | 55.50 | 70.52 | +29 | 2.9% | Buy (85) |
Baxter International | BAX | Feb 2024 | 38.79 | 41.94 | +9 | 2.8% | Buy (60) |
Mid Cap1 ($1 billion - $10 billion) Current Recommendations
Recommendation | Symbol | Rec. Issue | Price at Rec. | 3/22/24 | Total Return (3) | Current Yield | Rating and Price Target |
Mattel | MAT | May 2015 | 28.43 | 19.44 | -19 | 0% | Buy (38) |
Adient plc | ADNT | Oct 2018 | 39.77 | 32.99 | -16 | 0% | Buy (55) |
Xerox Holdings | XRX | Dec 2020 | 21.91 | 17.02 | -7 | 5.9% | Buy (33) |
Viatris | VTRS | Feb 2021 | 17.43 | 11.84 | -24 | 4.1% | Buy (26) |
TreeHouse Foods | THS | Oct 2021 | 39.43 | 38.09 | -3 | 0% | Buy (60) |
The Western Union Co. | WU | Dec 2021 | 16.4 | 13.72 | -2 | 6.9% | Buy (25) |
Brookfield Reinsurance | BNRE | Jan 2022 | 61.32 | 42.02 | -16** | 0.8% | Buy (93) |
Polaris, Inc. | PII | Feb 2022 | 105.78 | 95.65 | -4 | 2.8% | Buy (160) |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. | GT | Mar 2022 | 16.01 | 13.09 | -18 | 0.0% | Buy (24.50) |
Janus Henderson Group | JHG | Jun 2022 | 27.17 | 32.5 | +30 | 4.8% | Buy (41) |
Six Flags Entertainment | SIX | Dec 2022 | 22.6 | 25.35 | +12 | 0.0% | Buy (35) |
Kohl’s Corporation | KSS | Mar 2023 | 32.43 | 26.37 | -11 | 8% | Buy (50) |
Frontier Group Holdings | ULCC | May 2023 | 9.49 | 6.94 | -27 | 0.0% | Buy (15) |
Advance Auto Parts | AAP | Sep 2023 | 64.08 | 85.76 | +35 | 1.2% | Buy (98) |
Mohawk Industries | MHK | Jan 2024 | 103.11 | 125.12 | +21 | 0.0% | Buy (165) |
VF Corporation | VFC | Mar 2024 | 16.24 | 14.09 | -13 | 2.6% | Buy (25) |
Barnes Group | B | Apr 2024 | 36.55 | 36.55 | na | 1.8% | Buy (55) |
Small Cap1 (under $1 billion) Current Recommendations
Recommendation | Symbol | Rec. Issue | Price at Rec. | 3/22/24 | Total Return (3) | Current Yield | Rating and Price Target |
Gannett Company | GCI | Aug-17 | 16.99 | 2.22 | -2 | 0% | Buy (9) |
Duluth Holdings | DLTH | Feb-20 | 8.68 | 4.81 | -45 | 0% | Buy (20) |
Dril-Quip | DRQ | May-21 | 28.28 | 24.62 | -13 | 0% | Buy (44) |
L.B. Foster Company | FSTR | Jul-23 | 13.6 | 23.29 | +71 | 0% | SELL |
Kopin Corporation | KOPN | Aug-23 | 2.03 | 1.9 | -6 | 0% | Buy (5) |
Ammo, Inc. | POWW | Oct-23 | 1.99 | 2.71 | +36 | 0% | Buy (3.50) |
Most Recent Closed-Out Recommendations
Recommendation | Symbol | Category | Buy Issue | Price At Buy | Sell Issue | Price At Sell | Total Return(3) |
Signet Jewelers Limited | SIG | Small | Oct 2019 | 17.47 | *Dec 2021 | 104.62 | +505 |
General Motors | GM | Large | May 2011 | 32.09 | *Dec 2021 | 62.19 | +122 |
GCP Applied Technologies | GCP | Mid | Jul 2020 | 17.96 | *Jan 2022 | 31.82 | +77 |
Baker Hughes Company | BKR | Mid | Sep 2020 | 14.53 | *April 2022 | 33.65 | +140 |
Vistra Corporation | VST | Mid | Jun 2021 | 16.68 | * May 2022 | 25.35 | +56 |
Altria Group | MO | Large | Mar 2021 | 43.80 | *June 2022 | 51.09 | +27 |
Marathon Oil | MRO | Large | Sep 2021 | 12.01 | *July 2022 | 31.68 | +166 |
Credit Suisse | CS | Large | Jun 2017 | 14.48 | * Aug 2022 | 5.11 | -58 |
Lamb Weston | LW | Mid | May 2020 | 61.36 | *Sept 2022 | 80.72 | +35 |
Shell plc | SHEL | Large | Jan 2015 | 69.95 | *Dec 2022 | 56.82 | +16 |
Kraft Heinz Company | KHC | Large | Jun 2019 | 28.68 | *Dec 2022 | 39.79 | +60 |
GE Heathcare Tech. | GEHC | Large | Spin-off | 60.49 | *Jan 2023 | 58.95 | -3 |
Conduent | CNDT | Mid | Feb 2017 | 14.96 | *Mar 2023 | 4.17 | -72 |
Meta Platforms | META | Large | Jan 2023 | 118.04 | *Mar 2023 | 186.53 | +58 |
Dow | DOW | Large | Oct 2022 | 43.90 | *Mar 2023 | 60.09 | +38 |
Organon & Co. | OGN | Mid | Jul 2021 | 30.19 | *April 2023 | 23.74 | -15 |
Brookfield Asset Mgt | BAM | Large | Spin-off | 32.40 | *April 2023 | 33.66 | +5 |
ZimVie | ZIMV | Small | Apr-22 | 23.00 | *April 2023 | 5.63 | -76 |
Ironwood Pharma | IRWD | Mid | Jan-21 | 12.02 | *Jun 2023 | 10.81 | -10 |
M/I Homes | MHO | Mid | May-22 | 44.28 | *Jun 2023 | 73.49 | +66 |
Molson Coors Bev. Co. | TAP | Large | Jul-19 | 54.96 | * July 2023 | 66.46 | +30 |
Toshiba Corporation | TOSYY | Large | Nov-17 | 14.49 | * Sept 2023 | 15.72 | +25 |
Holcim Ltd. | HCMLY | Large | Apr-18 | 10.92 | *Sept 2023 | 13.41 | +48 |
ESAB Corporation | ESAB | Mid | Jul-22 | 45.64 | *Sept 2023 | 67.95 | +49 |
First Horizon Corp | FHN | Mid | Apr-23 | 16.76 | *Sept 2023 | 12.74 | -23 |
Kaman Corp | KAMN | Mid | Nov-21 | 37.41 | *Feb 2024 | 45.05 | +25 |
Notes to ratings:
1. Based on market capitalization on the Recommendation date.
2. Total return includes price changes and dividends, with adjustments as necessary for stock splits and mergers.
* Indicates mid-month change in Recommendation rating. For Sells, price and returns are as-of the Sell date.
** BNRE return includes spin-off value of BAM shares.
*** GE total return includes spin-off value of GEHC shares at January 6, 2023 closing price to reflect our sale.
The next Cabot Turnaround Letter will be published on April 24, 2024.
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